Chalabigate
"Weapons of Mass Deception"
2002-12-22
Here's Some News, but Be Careful
By Michael Getler
Sunday, December 22, 2002
One of the many challenges to news organizations brought about by the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and subsequent threats of war against Iraq is how to deal with murky stories: Terrorists may be planning this, al Qaeda is thought to be doing that, Iraq is believed to be hiding this and that. When does it become news rather than speculation?
The Post has a strong record, stretching back many years, of credible reporting on secretive subjects. But what brought this subject to mind, for me and a number of readers, was a prominent front-page story Dec. 12 headlined "U.S. Suspects Al Qaeda Got Nerve Agent From Iraqis." The lead said: "The Bush administration has received a credible report that Islamic extremists affiliated with al Qaeda took possession of a chemical weapon in Iraq last month or late in October, according to two officials with firsthand knowledge of the report and its source." Now, that sounds like news. Indeed, it suggested a one-two punch -- Iraq still possessed such weapons and it seemed to have ties to al Qaeda. The story was by Barton Gellman, one of the paper's most respected bylines.
But beginning with the second paragraph, which started out, "If the report proves true . . ." the story contains an extraordinary array of flashing yellow lights. Some other examples: "On the central question whether Iraqi President Saddam Hussein knew about or authorized such a transaction, U.S. analysts are said to have no evidence." "Like most intelligence, the reported chemical weapon transfer is not backed by definitive evidence." Spokesmen, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said that "the principal source on the chemical transfer was uncorroborated, and that indications that it involved a nerve agent were open to interpretation." "Among the uncertainties . . . is the precise relationship of the Islamic operatives to the al Qaeda network" and "officials said they did not know whether [an extremist group's] pursuit of chemical weapons was specifically on al Qaeda's behalf." And "the government is also uncertain whether the transaction involved a chemical agent alone or an agent in what is known as a weaponized form."
It is to Gellman's and The Post's credit that all of these uncertainties are laid out. But the effect on the complaining readers, and on me, is to ask what, after all, is the use of this story that practically begs you not to put much credence in it? Why was it so prominently displayed, and why not wait until there was more certainty about the intelligence?
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, when asked about the story the next day, said that he had not seen it but that he had "seen other information over a period of time that suggests that could be happening." But Sean McCormack, spokesman for the National Security Council, was also asked about it by foreign reporters. He noted concern about al Qaeda's attempts to obtain such weapons but said: "To date, we have no credible evidence that they have actually succeeded in that."
Post Managing Editor Steve Coll says: "We scrutinized the sources of Bart's story carefully. We were convinced that the intelligence report his story described had in fact circulated in recent weeks, that it had been taken very seriously, and that it had galvanized a robust, if largely secret, response within the national security establishment. We knew that the existence of the report, unknown to the public, was shaping perceptions and decision-making inside the administration. We were aware that by publishing our account we would be accused of carrying the administration's water on Iraq. Knowing this was false, we decided that the right thing to do was to publish anyway and take our lumps.
"The public had a strong interest in knowing the contents of this intelligence report, however uncertain the truth about the underlying event, and however inconvenient the timing of its publication might be for the administration. We tried to make as clear as we could, without jeopardizing our crucial agreements to protect sources, that this story had been dug out by a reporter's enterprise and not handed down as an authorized leak.
"Most of what the public knows about the secret war on terror is announced by government spokespeople or handed out in authorized briefings. We feel an obligation to dig out and responsibly publish our own independent accounts of the reported threats and challenges faced by American civilians and soldiers, as well as the information on which the administration bases important homeland security and foreign policy decisions."
You can reach me at (202) 334-7582 or via e-mail at:
ombudsman@washpost.com.
This site may contain copyrighted material the use of which has not always been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, the material on this site is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml. If you wish to use copyrighted material from this site for purposes of your own that go beyond 'fair use', you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.
Sunday, December 22, 2002
One of the many challenges to news organizations brought about by the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and subsequent threats of war against Iraq is how to deal with murky stories: Terrorists may be planning this, al Qaeda is thought to be doing that, Iraq is believed to be hiding this and that. When does it become news rather than speculation?
The Post has a strong record, stretching back many years, of credible reporting on secretive subjects. But what brought this subject to mind, for me and a number of readers, was a prominent front-page story Dec. 12 headlined "U.S. Suspects Al Qaeda Got Nerve Agent From Iraqis." The lead said: "The Bush administration has received a credible report that Islamic extremists affiliated with al Qaeda took possession of a chemical weapon in Iraq last month or late in October, according to two officials with firsthand knowledge of the report and its source." Now, that sounds like news. Indeed, it suggested a one-two punch -- Iraq still possessed such weapons and it seemed to have ties to al Qaeda. The story was by Barton Gellman, one of the paper's most respected bylines.
But beginning with the second paragraph, which started out, "If the report proves true . . ." the story contains an extraordinary array of flashing yellow lights. Some other examples: "On the central question whether Iraqi President Saddam Hussein knew about or authorized such a transaction, U.S. analysts are said to have no evidence." "Like most intelligence, the reported chemical weapon transfer is not backed by definitive evidence." Spokesmen, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said that "the principal source on the chemical transfer was uncorroborated, and that indications that it involved a nerve agent were open to interpretation." "Among the uncertainties . . . is the precise relationship of the Islamic operatives to the al Qaeda network" and "officials said they did not know whether [an extremist group's] pursuit of chemical weapons was specifically on al Qaeda's behalf." And "the government is also uncertain whether the transaction involved a chemical agent alone or an agent in what is known as a weaponized form."
It is to Gellman's and The Post's credit that all of these uncertainties are laid out. But the effect on the complaining readers, and on me, is to ask what, after all, is the use of this story that practically begs you not to put much credence in it? Why was it so prominently displayed, and why not wait until there was more certainty about the intelligence?
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, when asked about the story the next day, said that he had not seen it but that he had "seen other information over a period of time that suggests that could be happening." But Sean McCormack, spokesman for the National Security Council, was also asked about it by foreign reporters. He noted concern about al Qaeda's attempts to obtain such weapons but said: "To date, we have no credible evidence that they have actually succeeded in that."
Post Managing Editor Steve Coll says: "We scrutinized the sources of Bart's story carefully. We were convinced that the intelligence report his story described had in fact circulated in recent weeks, that it had been taken very seriously, and that it had galvanized a robust, if largely secret, response within the national security establishment. We knew that the existence of the report, unknown to the public, was shaping perceptions and decision-making inside the administration. We were aware that by publishing our account we would be accused of carrying the administration's water on Iraq. Knowing this was false, we decided that the right thing to do was to publish anyway and take our lumps.
"The public had a strong interest in knowing the contents of this intelligence report, however uncertain the truth about the underlying event, and however inconvenient the timing of its publication might be for the administration. We tried to make as clear as we could, without jeopardizing our crucial agreements to protect sources, that this story had been dug out by a reporter's enterprise and not handed down as an authorized leak.
"Most of what the public knows about the secret war on terror is announced by government spokespeople or handed out in authorized briefings. We feel an obligation to dig out and responsibly publish our own independent accounts of the reported threats and challenges faced by American civilians and soldiers, as well as the information on which the administration bases important homeland security and foreign policy decisions."
You can reach me at (202) 334-7582 or via e-mail at:
ombudsman@washpost.com.
This site may contain copyrighted material the use of which has not always been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, the material on this site is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml. If you wish to use copyrighted material from this site for purposes of your own that go beyond 'fair use', you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.
Milton Frihetsson, 07:34
